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Since the advent of genetic databases in the 1990’s, personalized medicine (PM) 
has been heralded as the future of medical treatment.  Although the expected revolution 
has been more of a slow and arduous journey, the FDA has put forth significant effort to 
pave the way for PM techniques in the approval process.  The nascent field has recently 
been threatened, however, by an unprecedented apportionment of federal funds to 
comparative effectiveness research (CER), a government project aimed at enhancing 
efficiency in federal spending by assessing the relative effectiveness of available 
treatment options across populations.  A great deal of literature attempts to predict the 
likely impact of CER, which is intended to study effectiveness among populations or 
subgroups, and PM, which focuses on effectiveness in the individual.  The general 
consensus is that the impact will be a positive one, with both strategies mutually 
enhancing the quality of medical treatment for each individual.  Few have expounded 
upon the effects of CER on PM at the FDA in particular, however. This paper explores 
some of the ways in which CER may interact with the FDA’s stated goal of furthering 
PM.  It concludes that in spite of certain practical limitations on the symbiotic 












Last year, lung cancer diagnosis was a death sentence for 159,390 Americans.
1 
Due to AstraZeneca’s revolutionary drug Iressa, however, approximately ten percent of 
patients diagnosed with non small cell lung cancer have hope.  A fortunate few possess a 
natural advantage: a mutation in the DNA coding sequence for a protein called epidermal 
growth factor receptor.  Iressa binds selectively to this mutated protein, inhibiting the 
spread and growth of tumors without the devastating effects of chemotherapy.
2  The drug 
obtained Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval in 2003 and has since been used 
to treat lung cancer in over 300,000 patients.
3 
As technology advances, such targeted drugs are becoming more common.  
Although the field is still nascent, so-called personalized medicine (PM) may soon 
revolutionize drug development and diagnostics by tailoring medical treatment to the 
wants, needs, and even the genome of the individual.  Janet Woodcock, the director of the 
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research at the FDA, ardently champions PM as “the 
future.”
4   
Accordingly, the FDA has made significant strides towards the implementation of 
PM in medical product development.
5  FDA’s boldest move has been the establishment 
of a framework for voluntary data submission under the Guidelines for Industry on 
                                                 
1 See National Cancer Institute, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/types/lung (last visited Mar. 6, 2010). 
2 See Iressa, http://www.iressa.com/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2010). 
3 See id. 
4 Janet Woodcock, The Prospects for “Personalized Medicine” in Drug Development and Drug Therapy, 
81 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 164, 169 (2007). 
5 Michael Rugnetta, FDA Embraces Personalized Medicine, SCIENCE PROGRESS, Feb. 6, 2009, 
http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009/02/fda-embraces-personalized-medicine/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).   3   
 
Pharmacogenomic Data Submissions (the guidelines).
6  The submissions are intended “to 
help identify sources of inter-individual variability in drug response (both effectiveness 
and toxicity)”
7 with the ultimate goal of gathering data to “individualize therapy with the 
intent of maximizing effectiveness and minimizing risk.”
8  They also indicate a process 
by which companies can qualify biomarkers
9 for clinical use.
10  In addition, the Critical 
Path Initiative (CPI), designed to enhance efficiency in product development, has a 
special focus on the individualization of medical care.
11  The guidelines have inspired a 
number of subsequent initiatives, including a review group for pharmacogenomic data 
submissions, a trial process for qualification of biomarkers, and a preliminary FDA 
publication summarizing discussions of the submission process.
12  To coordinate these 
efforts, a position was created for a Senior Genomics Advisor in February 2009.
13  In 
addition to their contributions to the industry, many FDA officials are responsible for a 
                                                 
6 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PHARMACOGENOMIC 
DATA SUBMISSIONS (2005), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm126957.pdf. 
7 Id. at 2. 
8 Id.  
9 The Guidelines define a biomarker as “a characteristic that is objectively measured and evaluated as an 
indicator of normal biologic processes, pathogenic processes, or pharmacologic responses to a therapeutic 
intervention.”  Id. at 17, citing Biomarkers Definitions Working Group, Biomarkers and Surrogate 
Endpoints: Preferred Definitions and Conceptual Framework, 69 CLINICAL PHARM. & THERAPEUTICS 
(2001). 
10 See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES & U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE CRITICAL 
PATH INITIATIVE 8 (2009), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/CriticalPathInitiative/UCM186110.pdf. 
11 See Critical Path Initiative: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/CriticalPathInitiative/ucm077015.htm (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2010). 
12 See Federico Goodsaid & Felix W. Frueh, Implementing the U.S. FDA Guidance on 
Pharmacogenomic Data Submissions, 48 ENVIRONMENTAL AND MOLECULAR MUTAGENESIS 354, 354 
(2007). 
13 See Kathryn Foxhall, FDA Creates New Genomics Position, MEDSCAPE TODAY, Feb. 6, 2009, 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/587963 (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).   4   
 
vast body of scholarship on the topic.
14  In light of all these efforts, it would not be a 
stretch to say that in the field of PM, perhaps the FDA has already exceeded the science 
itself.
15  
Although these initiatives are relatively new, their scope and magnitude 
demonstrate the FDA’s strong commitment to PM.  Unfortunately, recent legislation 
mandating the apportionment of $1.1 billion to comparative effectiveness research (CER) 
has raised concerns that PM may be reduced to a passing fad.
16  Stated simply, the goal of 
CER is to compare the “real-world” effectiveness of available “health care treatments and 
strategies.”
17  The funding was allocated under the 2009 American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which also established a Federal Coordinating Council 
(FCC) for Comparative Effectiveness Research for the purpose of overseeing federal 
spending on the project.
18  This unprecedented federal investment in CER has raised the 
ire of many PM advocates, who are concerned that such studies will only yield data about 
appropriate medical treatment for large populations, or at best for easily identifiable 
subgroups.  
Will the advent of CER hinder the FDA’s stated goal of advancing PM? 
Advocates of both frameworks are actively working to coordinate the two approaches, 
                                                 
14 See Genomics at FDA – Publications by FDA Staff, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/Pharmacogenetics/ucm085426.htm (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2010). 
15 Most commentators are in agreement that the field of PM is still in an early stage.  See e.g., Muin J. 
Koury et al., Comparative Effectiveness Research and Genomic Medicine: An Evolving Partnership for 21
st 
Century Medicine, 11 GENETICS IN MEDICINE 707, 708 (2009) (noting that most known genetic variants 
have little clinical utility).  Moreover, the guidelines up until this point have largely served as a forum for 
debate about the future shape of clinical trials in the era of personalized medicine.  See Goodsaid, supra 
note 12, at 354. 
16 See The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 42 U.S.C. §229b-8 (2009). 
17 FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS, RESEARCH REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/cer/cerannualrpt.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2010). 
18 See 42 U.S.C. §229b-8.   5   
 
which, according to a recent statement by Janet Woodcock, are “synergistic.”
19  This 
paper will discuss some of the most prevalent differences and similarities between the 
two strategies that have been identified in the literature, and will then make a prognosis 
for how these differences will play out on a practical level for the FDA. 
II. DEFINITIONS 
 
According to the text of the ARRA, the purpose of CER is to “accelerate the 
development and dissemination of research assessing the comparative effectiveness of 
health care treatments and strategies.”
20  In furtherance of this goal, the FCC is instructed 
to:  
1.  Conduct, support, or synthesize research that compares the clinical 
outcomes,  effectiveness,  and  appropriateness  of  items,  services, 
and procedures that are used to prevent, diagnose, or treat diseases, 
disorders, and other health conditions; and 
2.  encourage the development and use of clinical registries, clinical 
data networks, and other forms of electronic health data that can be 
used to generate or obtain outcomes data.
21 
 
PM is a much more nebulous concept, indirectly implicated in several FDA 
regulations but never explicitly defined.  Congress has offered a recent articulation of PM 
in H.R. 6498: “[t]he application of genomic and molecular data to better target the 
delivery of health care, facilitate the discovery and clinical testing of new products, help 
determine a person's predisposition to a particular disease or condition, and identify any 
targeted prevention strategies for that predisposition.”
22 
                                                 
19 Gregory Twatchman & Mary Houghton, Pink Sheet – CER and Personalized Medicine are “Synergistic” 
– FDA’s Woodcock, FRIENDS OF CANCER RESEARCH, 2009, http://www.focr.org/pink-sheet-cer-and-
personalized-medicine-are-qsynergisticq-fdas-woodcock.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
20 42 U.S.C. §229b-8. 
21 Id. 
22 Genomics and Personalized Medicine Act of 2008, H.R. 6498, 110
th Con. §2(2).    6   
 
Based solely on the plain language of the legislative definitions, a plausible 
conclusion is that Congress was simply implementing the goals of PM in its mandate to 
the FCC regarding CER.  Both are directed towards the accumulation of information 
which will enhance health outcomes on an individualized basis.  At the highest level of 
generality, both PM and CER are directed towards promotion of the public health.  More 
specifically, Congress envisions both strategies as involving a broad array of treatment 
options, including drugs, devices, and strategies.  Finally, both require (explicitly and 
implicitly) an infrastructure for the accumulation of health care data. 
The similarities are highlighted in the FCC’s report to the President and the 
Congress in June 2009 (2009 report).
23  In this report, the FCC interpreted its directive as 
requiring that CER “inform patients, providers, and decision-makers, responding to their 
expressed needs, about which interventions are most effective for which patients under 
specific circumstances.”
24  The entire report is replete with language about the patient as 
an individual, emphasizing the patient-centered approach to CER studies.
25  
Thus at first blush, the two regimes do not appear to be significantly different 
from a Congressional perspective.  However, as with all legislative enactments, under the 
surface many complex and conflicting considerations exist.  The following analysis 
discloses some of the theoretical differences and similarities between PM and CER that 






                                                 
23 See FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 17. 
24 Id. at 16. 
25 Id.   7   
 
III. THEORETICAL COMPARISON 
 
A. Person v. Group 
 
One of the most prominent concerns about the compatibility of CER with PM is 
that CER is aimed at determining effectiveness across entire populations, while PM is 
focused on finding the best medical treatment for individuals.  The FCC’s concession to 
PM advocates from the 2009 report effectively ignores this conflict, and attempts to 
alleviate concerns about the de-personalization of medicine by incorporating subgroup 
analysis into the CER framework.
26  Its concession, however, overlooks the problem: a 
group does not cease to be a group by virtue of its small size or shared characteristics. 
Nonetheless, the apparent distinction between subgroup and individual may only 
be semantic.  As long as CER studies are capable of defining the correct groups for which 
a given medical treatment is effective, then the distinction between group and individual 
collapses.
27  Grouping individuals into subgroups only frustrates the goals of PM when 
subgroups are ill-defined.  A good analogy is that of cultural stereotypes.  Society objects 
to such stereotypes because they are often inaccurate and overbroad, thus encouraging 
people to make incorrect assumptions about individuals which comprise them.  However, 
if a stereotype of a certain group of individuals is an accurate description of all 
individuals within the group, then there are no problems with applying characteristics of 
the stereotype to the individual.  Similarly, if CER is able to precisely identify all 
                                                 
26 See FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 17, at 24 (“At the 
same time that CER is being used to identify which interventions and strategies work best on average, it 
can also help to identify different responses by different groups of patients.”). 
27 See CLIFFORD GOODMAN, THE LEWIN GROUP, COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH AND 
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE: FROM CONTRADICTION TO SYNERGY 25 (2009), available at 
http://www.lewin.com/content/publications/Lewin_CER-PM.pdf.    8   
 
subgroups relevant for a particular treatment, then the patient’s treatment is properly 
tailored to the individual’s needs.  
B. Prospective v. Retrospective 
 
To date, many developments in personalized medicine have been made 
retrospectively, through lengthy observation of clinical outcomes after a medical product 
or strategy has been released onto the market.  The typical PM success story is that of an 
approved drug with a curious pattern of effectiveness, whose clinical trial data eventually 
accumulates to demonstrate special success in a particular subgroup.
28  In contrast, CER 
studies are designed to predict effectiveness in patients a priori, skipping over the years 
of clinical observation that are generally a prerequisite for advances in PM.
29  
Nonetheless, the heretofore retrospective nature of PM may not be an intrinsic 
quality of this strategy.  Quite to the contrary, advocates of PM aspire to make it more 
prospective by reducing the luck element to an exact science.
30  CER endangers PM only 
if prospective studies are incapable of identifying relevant subgroups and producing 
accurate results at the subgroup level, absent large amounts of clinical data.
31  In other 
words, CER comes into conflict with PM only if research in furtherance of PM is 
necessarily retrospective by nature.  
Furthermore, the second goal of CER – involving the collection of clinical data – 
evidences a realization that certain discoveries can only be made retrospectively, upon 
                                                 
28 See e.g,. Ken Garber, Trial Offers Early Test Case for Personalized Medicine, 101 JCNI NEWS 136 
(2009) (describing several targeted cancer drugs whose individualized properties were only discovered 
upon retrospective analysis of clinical data). 
29 See FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 17. 
30 See e.g., Janet Woodcock, The Prospects for “Personalized Medicine” in Drug Development and Drug 
Therapy, 81 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 164, (2007) at 164. 
31 See GOODMAN, supra note 27, at 7-9.   9   
 
observation of years of data from a wide array of patients.  Thus CER incorporates both 
prospective and retrospective elements. 
C. Financial considerations 
 
While both strategies are aimed at the enhancement of medical efficiency, CER is 
more concerned with financial efficiency.  For evidence of a financial incentive driving 
CER, one need only look to the context in which the recent federal stimulus for CER was 
apportioned: the ARRA.  The ARRA’s website stipulates that “while many of Recovery 
Act projects are focused more immediately on jumpstarting the economy, others, 
especially those involving infrastructure improvements, are expected to contribute to 
economic growth for many years.”
32  Looking at the stimulus package as a whole, it 
seems impossible to view CER as anything but a government investment, and the 
government would not make a $1.1 billion investment without any expectation of 
financial gain.  Furthermore, as noted above, the 2009 report cites inefficient Medicare 
spending as one of the primary motivators of CER, indicating that even the FCC, in using 
the funds apportioned by the act, has financial considerations in mind.
33 
The ARRA and the 2009 report expressly disavow the use of information from CER 
studies for making financial decisions about insurance coverage in either the public or 
private sector.
34  Nonetheless, there is widespread concern that the research will be used 
to limit insurance coverage for medications that do not benefit the majority of patients, 
particularly under the proposed national health care plan.
35 
                                                 
32 Recovery.gov, http://www.recovery.gov/About/Pages/The_Act.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2010). 
33 See FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 17, at 11. 
34 See Section 804 of the ARRA.  
35 See e.g., AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND REIMBURSEMENT 
DECISIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR INCREASED COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH (2008), available at 
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/health/comparative.pdf.   10   
 
In contrast, PM emerged from an academic, scientific background.  The term was 
coined in the late 1990’s with the explosion of discoveries about the human genome and 
the effects of its diversity on drug response.
36  Certainly large amounts of PM studies are 
funded with government money, such as NIH grants, and the strategy is generally thought 
to reduce the cost of medical care.  Its origins are simply less suspect since it arose from 
scientific discovery and is typically not championed as a means of cost-cutting. 
D. Efficiency 
 
In spite of the aforementioned differences, there are some acknowledged 
similarities between PM and CER.  One such similarity is that both strategies are aimed 
at the elimination of inefficiency in medical treatment.  The 2009 report cites inefficiency 
in spending of federal funds for medical care as one of the primary motivations for 
CER.
37  Similarly, the goal of PM is to discover which medical treatments are best 
tailored to the individual, and the most tailored treatment is by definition the most 
effective treatment.  
In addition to enhancing efficiency at the clinical level, both PM and CER have 
the potential to enhance efficiency in medical product development.  A corollary to 
finding the best medical treatment for an individual, in the case of PM, or a subgroup, in 
the case of CER, is that the best treatment is discovered as early as possible.  The early 
detection of special effectiveness during a clinical trial is most certainly preferable to 
discovery after years of usage, or worse, after FDA rejection based on ineffectiveness in 
patients as a whole.  Furthermore, both strategies could help to narrow clinical trials to 
groups which are actually relevant for a particular drug or medical product, saving time 
                                                 
36 See Philip R. Reilly, Personalized Medicine and Pharmacogenomics: New Tools for Disease 
Management, 5 DISEASE MANAGEMENT 69 (2004). 
37 See FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 17, at 11.   11   
 
and resources on superfluous study populations.
38  Thus successful implementation of 
both PM and CER may enhance efficiency at the product development level and at the 
clinical level. 
E. Health Information Technology (HIT) Infrastructure 
 
The most striking similarity between CER and PM is their demand for the 
establishment of HIT infrastructure.  Both programs rely upon the accumulation and 
dissemination of substantial amounts of data related to clinical outcomes in individual 
patients, ranging from genetic to socioeconomic factors.  This goal is stated expressly in 
the second mandate for the FCC, and is implied in any reasonable definition of PM.  
Indeed, the arrival of genetic databases, starting with the Human Genome Project, is 
largely responsible for the emergence of PM.
39 
  
IV. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE 
 
Although many FDA officials are responsible for literature comparing CER to 
PM, few works have discussed the effect of CER on PM at the FDA specifically.  There 
is a significant amount of study on CER’s applicability to clinical trial design, but most of 
the discussion is centered on scientific or theoretical concepts rather than practical 
implementation at the FDA.
40  Furthermore, the modern FDA is largely perceived to be 
                                                 
38 The FDA has recognized the value of PM in expediting product development through the CPI. The 
program was launched in response to concerns in the worsening trends of drug development efficiency, and 
developed into a mechanism for applying PM techniques to the pre-market process.  See HHS & FDA, 
supra note 10, at 8. 
39 Although personalized medicine currently encompasses factors not found in large databases, such as 
culture and lifestyle, originally it stemmed from the recognition that genetic differences have an impact on 
drug response.  The use of genetic factors to tailor medical treatment, pharmacogenomics, is perhaps the 
most widely recognized branch of personalized medicine.  See Reilly, supra note 36, at 39. 
40 Most of the literature discusses the potential for CER in improving clinical study design, but does not 
actually make predictions as to how the FDA will use information from CER, or about how CER studies 
will interact with clinical studies. See e.g., Alan M. Garber et al., Does Comparative-Effectiveness   12   
 
involved in pre-market research, while current CER studies are designed to test products 
and strategies that have already been approved.
41  Therefore it is not immediately obvious 
that the FDA will have any role to play in CER, or that CER will impact the FDA.  If the 
FDA is to become involved with CER, two threshold conditions must be satisfied: 1) the 
FDA must have legal jurisdiction over the goals of CER and 2) Congress must have 
intended for the FDA to play a role in CER. 
A. FDA Jurisdiction 
Legal jurisdiction is unlikely to present a barrier to the FDA’s involvement with 
CER given that the broad scope of the FDA’s congressionally delegated mission: 
1.  Promote  the  public  health  by  promptly  and  efficiently  reviewing 
clinical  research  and  taking  appropriate  action  on  the  marketing  of 
regulated products in a timely manner; 
2.  with respect to such products, protect the public health by assuring that 
[they are not adulterated or misbranded]. 
42  
 
One potential limitation is that these goals encompass only certain “regulated 
products,” including drugs, biologics, and medical devices, and might not extend to the 
“services and procedures” covered by CER.  Under the off-label use doctrine, physicians 
may employ FDA approved drugs, biologics, or medical devices for uses other than those 
that have been approved.
43  Thus, even if CER could prove a drug to be more beneficial 
in certain situations, the FDA would have limited power to enforce the preferred uses of 
the drug over all other possible uses. 
                                                                                                                                                
Research Threaten Personalized Medicine? 360 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1925 (2009) (discussing the problems 
with current clinical studies and explaining why CER will generate study designs which could advance PM 
in general). 
41 See Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality: Effective Health Care Program, 
http://www.effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) (referencing proposed 
studies available for review on the site as of March 2010). 
42 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, §903(b).  
43 “Off-Label” and Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics and Medical Devices, 
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/GuidancesInformationSheetsan
dNotices/ucm116355.htm (last visited on Mar. 7, 2010).   13   
 
Nonetheless, the FDA is not entirely powerless to prohibit unapproved product 
use.  Physicians who choose to employ a regulated product for unapproved uses “have 
the responsibility to be well informed about the product, to base its use on firm scientific 
rationale and on sound medical evidence, and to maintain records of the product's use and 
effects.” 
44  In addition, the FDA can mandate institutional oversight at any point in the 
process.
45  As to the second goal of CER, aimed at data collection, the FDA is not likely 
inhibited jurisdictionally.  There may be external limitations including privacy laws; 
however, the FDA embarked upon expansive data collection programs as early as the 
1960’s.
46  
The other potential limitation to the FDA’s involvement with CER – namely the 
post-approval nature of CER studies – is similarly surmountable.  Although most of the 
discussion regarding CER at the FDA has revolved around clinical trials, the FDA is not 
limited to pre-market research.  Historically, the FDA was merely responsible for 
enforcement actions after the entrance of a food or drug into the market.
47 Only recently 
has the FDA come to play a determinative role in product development, but it continues 
to perform a policing function for products that are already out on the marktet.
48  
B. Congressional Intent 
 
Although the FDA’s legal jurisdiction does not present a bar to involvement with 
CER, it is possible that Congress did not envision the FDA as a major player in its 
execution.  Through budget appropriations, Congress has imparted primary responsibility 
                                                 
44 Id. 
45 See id. 
46 See PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 647 (3rd ed. 2007) 
(explaining that the data monitoring committee was established in the 1960s to collect and organize the 
“data emerging from large clinical studies to determine whether the study should be stopped . . . .”). 
47 See id. at 1-27. 
48 See id.   14   
 
for CER to agencies other than the FDA.
49  The National Institutes of Health (NIH) and 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) are the principal recipients, each 
having been apportioned $400 million.
50  The agency historically responsible for projects 
comparing effectiveness of medical treatments is the Federal Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ), which began receiving federal support for comparative 
clinical effectiveness in 2003.
51  Funding for these efforts has continued to rise steadily, 
and jumped to $300 million with the ARRA.
52  The FDA is noticeably absent from the 
recipient list, which raises doubts as to whether Congress intended for the FDA to be 
involved at all.   
The 2009 report, however, erases such doubts about the exclusion of the FDA 
from Congress’ plan for CER.  The report was authored in part by a member of the FDA 
and explicitly mentions the FDA six times.
53  The first time is in the context of clinical 
trials, for the purpose of differentiating CER from clinical efficacy studies.
54  The FDA is 
mentioned twice as playing a role in the “dissemination and translation” of information 
flowing from CER, once as a resource for expertise on effectiveness trials, and twice for 
“data infrastructure” development, specifically for the collection of data on “drug and 
device trials and safety.” 
55  Most importantly, the FDA is deeply and inextricably 
involved in the subject matter addressed by CER.  
Frankly, it is hard to imagine how CER – research focused on health outcomes 
relating to medical treatment – could fail to affect FDA policy and procedure.  The real 
                                                 
49 See GOODMAN, supra note 27, at 3.  
50 See id.  
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53 See FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 17. 
54 See id. at 6. 
55 Id. at 39, 41, 47, 68.    15   
 
question is how the FDA will interact with other public and private actors in the 
implementation of CER.  Of the two dominant actors in the arena of pre-market approval 
– the FDA and the PTO – it is not clear that the FDA should have primary responsibility 
for implementing the goals of CER.  In light of the ever-increasing backlog of patent 
applications, some have suggested enhancing the policing function of the PTO in 
eliminating applications which do not represent a significant improvement over the prior 
art.
56  The problem is especially apparent in the pharmaceutical industry, where seventy-
seven percent of drugs approved between 1998 and 2002 are “me-too” drugs, which do 
not provide any significant benefit over other drugs in the market.
57  
In addition to the PTO, Congress may have intended for the private sector to play 
a significant role to play in research and data accumulation.  Many patients are reluctant 
to submit themselves to clinical research, but being a test subject becomes less 
frightening from the local general practitioner’s office.  Advocates of PM have 
recognized private sector involvement by emphasizing the role of “multidisciplinary 
teams” including “behavioral and social scientists, medical ethicists, policy experts, 
mathematicians, physical and biological scientists,” just to name a few of the key 
players.
58 
Fortunately, the FCC was “established … to foster optimum coordination of CER 
conducted or supported by Federal departments and agencies.”
59  With the counsel of the 
FCC, the FDA could conceivably become a very active player in the development of 
                                                 
56 See e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 89-91 (Random House 2004). 
57 See id. 
58 Muin J. Khoury et al., Comparative Effectiveness Research and Genomic Medicine: An Evolving 
Partnership for 21
st Century Medicine, 11 GENETICS IN MEDICINE 707, 710 (2009). 
59 See FEDERAL COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 17, at 73.   16   
 
CER.  Three areas in particular have been suggested in the literature as feasible means of 
accommodating CER: clinical studies, information dissemination, and database 
accumulation.  The remainder of the paper will explore how the theoretical differences – 
cited in literature which compares CER to PM generally – will play out in the 
implementation of CER at the FDA in these three areas. 
 
V. CER AT THE FDA 
 
A. Clinical Trials 
 
To date, the FDA has not made significant progress towards PM in clinical trial 
design.
60  The guidelines merely create the opportunity for data submission on 
pharmacogenomic data, but as of 2007, only thirty submissions had been filed under this 
procedure, most of which were suggestions for improvement of clinical study design.
61 
Rather, the current procedures for clinical testing have arguably stunted the growth of 
PM.  A recent article went so far as to say that “the greatest obstacle to the adoption of 
personalized approaches such as genomic testing . . . is the lack of adequately designed 
studies assessing their clinical utility . . . .”
62  
In the case of Iressa, researchers were immediately able to rationalize the 
effectiveness disparity among subgroups because the distinction was drawn upon racial 
lines and the relevant mutation is of a common protein known to play a role in the drug’s 
                                                 
60 See e.g., Emily Singer, Personalized Medicine Prompts Push to Redesign Clinical Trials, 11 NATURE 
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activity.
63  However, such disparities may be very difficult to recognize in the context of 
a randomized controlled trial, and perhaps even more difficult to rationalize.
64 
Given that there is significant room for improvement, it is in the area of clinical 
study design that CER may hold the most promise for the furtherance of PM.  Through 
extremely large-scale studies, CER offers the “power to investigate effects at the sub-
group level that often cannot be determined in a randomized trial.”
65  CER studies might 
also include factors which have been neglected by the FDA’s current efforts to 
implement personalized medicine.
66  The 2009 report emphasizes that CER is intended to 
investigate a broad array of factors related to medical treatment, ranging from “linguistic 
and cultural attributes” to diet and environment – precisely the types of factors for which 
personalized medicine is intended to account.
67  Should CER not achieve its lofty goals 
of subgroup inclusion and superior study design, however, it also has the potential to pull 
clinical trials in the opposite direction, away from PM. 
1. Efficiency 
 
Pre-market approval through clinical trials is at the heart of the FDA’s current 
mission, and the agency is necessarily focused on resolving inefficiencies that occur 
before a product is released into the market.
68  In contrast, CER is motivated by a concern 
for efficiency at the clinical, or “real-world” level.
69  Nonetheless, the goals of the two 
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programs could perhaps overlap symbiotically to enhance efficiency at the FDA in at 
least three ways.  
First, lessons learned from the design of CER studies could be incorporated into 
FDA clinical trials.  Currently little is known about optimal study designs for discovering 
disparities in effectiveness, but “these are precisely these kinds of issues that CER is 
designed to address.”
70  FDA can benefit from this knowledge in crafting its own clinical 
study designs.  Secondly, the scientific information gleaned from CER could enhance 
efficiency in FDA clinical trials by providing generalized information about relevant 
subgroups for various types of medical treatments.  For example, if a pharmaceutical 
company knows from CER studies that a particular genre of drug is likely to be more 
effective in a particular subgroup, then it can initiate clinical studies on only that 
subgroup.  Finally, CER might improve the quality of new product applications received 
by the FDA by incentivizing development of products which represent significant 
improvements over current treatment options.  Hopefully, large scale implementation of 
CER will stem the tide of “me-too” drugs, those which do not provide any significant 
advantage over prior art.
71  In this way CER may create a wider variety of opportunities 
for medical regimes that are genuinely different. 
Such potential for overlap raises the concern that FDA clinical trials and the CER 
initiative might render either one or the other superfluous.  Why undergo any clinical 
trials when more rigorous testing of the same nature is required in the future?  Or, on the 
other hand, why require post-release testing when the FDA already has incorporated all 
elements of that testing into its approval requirements?  The answer to this question 
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depends largely upon the coordination efforts of the FCC.  Regardless of efforts to assess 
efficiency after market release, however, clearly some study will be necessary prior to 
market release.  The FCC and the FDA will simply have to struggle with where to draw 
the line between studies which must be completed prior to release and those which must 
be completed subsequent to release. 
2. Financial considerations 
 
CER’s opponents highlight the paramount importance of financial considerations 
in the shaping of related legislation and regulatory programs.
72  Most of these concerns 
arise out of a fear that insurance coverage decisions – particularly of government health 
insurance programs – will be based on this research.  While the FDA’s pronouncements 
may affect coverage decisions, regulation of such decisions is beyond the jurisdictional 
reach of the FDA.
73  FDA determines which drugs, biologics, and medical devices are 
released onto the market, but can only indirectly affect who receives those products 
through labeling and the media.
74 
Quite to the contrary, the financial motivations driving CER could spur PM 
research in ways that benefit the FDA.  Drug development is already an incredibly 
expensive venture;
75 imposing additional costs on the industry by requiring the testing of 
relative effectiveness could seriously disincentivize drug development.  Currently the 
private sector bears the expense of costly FDA clinical trials, but hopefully the 
apportionment of federal funds to CER will allow the public to reap the benefits of such 
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studies without imposing the costs on private industry.  Concededly most CER studies are 
envisioned to occur subsequent to FDA approval;
76 however as mentioned above, CER 
studies have the potential to enhance pre-market clinical trials through the development 
of improved study designs and by providing information about relevant subgroups.  
3. Prospective v. Retrospective 
 
As explained above, synergy between CER and PM in clinical trials is dependent 
upon the accuracy of CER in identifying relevant subgroups and assessing a treatment’s 
effectiveness in those subgroups.  The previous failures of the FDA to assess relative 
effectiveness in clinical trials raise doubts as to whether prospective studies of any kind 
are capable of this feat.  Some of the reasons for current deficiencies in FDA clinical 
study design include small data samples, underrepresentation of demographic subgroups, 
and an inability to account for currently “unrecognized genetic or physiologic 
pharmacodynamic” differences.
77  The 2009 report additionally criticizes FDA clinical 
trials for their failure to assess “real-world” clinical utility.
78  Consequently, it comes as 
no surprise that according to the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics and Health 
in Society, most attempts at personalizing medicine via genomic testing have not been 
clinically successful.
79   
Certainly CER analysis will run into the same problems that the FDA has 
encountered in attempting to alter clinical trials to incorporate PM.  Retrospective PM 
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studies have the advantage of years of clinical data, which may prove to be necessary.  
Effectively, CER may be attempting to impose a prospective framework onto a field that 
may not be capable of accommodating it.  
Presumably many of the obstacles encountered by the FDA are not entirely 
insurmountable.  Perhaps the missing link between retrospective and prospective studies 
is merely technological advancement.  Increased federal funding for CER may decrease 
development costs to some extent, and the accumulation of databases should bring costs 
back down after an initial period of sharp increase.  In light of the resources – in both 
money and time – being poured into CER, there is at least some hope that it will be 
successful in assessing true relative effectiveness among subgroups in a prospective 
manner.   
4. Group v. Individual 
 
This putative conflict implicates the same issues that exist for the 
retrospective/prospective conflict described above.  Essentially, there is no conflict in the 
event that CER is actually able to identify subgroups relevant for a medical treatment and 
compare them accurately, i.e., as long as CER actually accomplishes its stated goals. 
Given the history of CER, which has not been terribly diligent in its inclusion of 
subgroups, the outlook appears fairly bleak for PM.  According to a study conducted by 
the Congressional Research Service, only thirteen percent of comparative clinical 
effectiveness studies published in the peer-reviewed literature during the period between 
January 2004 and August 2007 analyzed variation in effectiveness for subpopulations 
other than white middle-age adults. 
80  Concededly, a cursory review of the AHRQ’s 
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website evinces an intent to move in the direction of greater subgroup inclusion.  Of the 
six proposed research studies available for comment, all suggest a list of relevant 
subgroups for comparative study.
81  These subgroups all involve distinctions based on 
age, gender, ethnicity, and health status relative to the treatment at issue.
82 
An additional snag implicated by this conflict is CER’s emphasis on racial 
subgroups, which may make correct group identification even more difficult.  Many of 
CER’s concessions to PM advocates from the 2009 report involve the guarantee that 
racial subgroups will be considered in CER studies.  In fact, one of the stated goals of the 
report is to include previously underrepresented ethnic subgroups in CER studies.  While 
this appears to be a laudable goal, both in furtherance of CER and in FDA clinical trials, 
significant complications result from using self-identified racial subgroups for scientific 
analysis, particularly in the field of genetics. 
A glance at the current list of approved biomarkers reveals the limited relevance 
of racial distinctions.  Fewer than half of genetic disparities in drug response are a 
consequence of ethnicity.
83  Although racial distinctions are the most easily observed and 
thus might be the most logical choice for a clinically relevant biomarker, a large body of 
scientific scholarship exists that discounts the genetic relevance of race.  First of all, race 
is not a well-defined genetic category; rather it is a continuum.  “One’s ethnicity/race is, 
at best, a probabilistic guess at one’s true genetic makeup.”
84  In 1999, no less an 
authority than the Institute of Medicine stated that race could no longer be considered a 
“biological reality” but was instead a “construct of human variability based on perceived 
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differences in biology, physical appearance, and behavior.”
85  Thus as the cost of genome 
sequencing continually falls, it may become unnecessary to use racial distinctions as a 
proxy for real genetic differences.  
The foregoing analysis is not intended to discount the clear advantages of 
including racial minorities in clinical trials.  Greater diversity in the test population can 
provide results that are more individualized, and greater diversity in ethnicity in 
particular can contribute information about cultural factors in medicine.  The FDA will 
have to be vigilant, however, in applying principles gleaned from CER to clinical trials. 
B.  Information Dissemination 
 
Successful integration of PM and CER depends upon the communication of study 
results to the public in “an accurate, comprehensible manner” that includes study 
limitations.
86  Patients cannot make health care decisions for themselves as individuals 
without access to information about treatment efficacy.  Hence none of the 
aforementioned theoretical conflicts between PM and CER poses an obstacle in the area 
of information dissemination; in this regard, the two strategies are perfectly aligned.  
Most of the concerns with CER – prospectivity and the group/individual 
distinction – are centered on study design, which is not affected by information 
dissemination.  Financial considerations may drive what kinds of information reach the 
public, and thus PM advocates could argue that the government might impede PM by 
selectively disclosing information about large populations rather than subgroups.  This 
scenario seems unlikely, however, given the FCC’s explicit emphasis on subgroup 
                                                 
85 Sandra Soo-Jin Lee et al., The Meaning of Race in New Genomics: Implications for Health Disparities 
Research, YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, & ETHICS 33, 38 (2001). 
86 GOODMAN, supra note 27, at 20.   24   
 
assessment
87 and the multitude of safeguards against secrecy in administrative policy-
making.
88  There remains the potential for inefficiency through duplicative efforts, but 
such redundancies could be eliminated through coordination by the FCC.  
Fortunately, the optimal infrastructure for information dissemination already 
exists at the FDA in the form of labeling requirements.  The 2009 report repeatedly 
emphasizes the patient-oriented nature of CER, focusing on decisions at the level of the 
patient-doctor relationship.
89  What more direct and effective way to reach both 
physicians and patients than labeling?  Since the FDA has already established a very 
structured approach to labeling through decades of experience, inclusion of CER data on 
product labels would be a natural progression.  Such directions would serve to enhance 
both PM and CER by tailoring decisions to the individual patient.  Additionally, publicity 
is one of the FDA’s most powerful assets;
90 thus it seems that the FDA is particularly 
well equipped to disseminate information to the public.  
C.  Database Accumulation 
 
Another explicit area of overlap between the goals of PM and CER is in the field 
of database accumulation.  Commentators universally acknowledge the paramount 
importance of the creation of an infrastructure to support health information technology 
(HIT), both for PM and for CER.
91  Such information could alleviate some of the 
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problems inherent in clinical trials by significantly increasing the population data set and 
hopefully by providing information about relevant subgroups.   
Use of data accumulation in CER could actually minimize the conflict between 
PM’s retrospective nature and CER’s prospective goals by incorporating a retrospective 
aspect into CER and enhancing the prospectivity of PM.  The (possibly) semantic 
distinction between group and individual is not present in legislative and administrative 
documents discussing data collection, as both strategies require information about 
medical outcome in individuals.
92  Financial considerations might affect the kind of data 
acquired for CER, but it is hard to imagine how data collection could hinder PM – a 
science based largely on genetic databases.
93  Perhaps the greatest danger is that the data 
gathering efforts of the FDA and the FCC will overlap, wasting government resources 
with duplicative efforts.  However it is easier to merge information from various agencies 
than to coordinate research projects among agencies, and the FCC is indubitably capable 
of the task. 
The FDA has already begun data accumulation efforts in furtherance of PM, 
beginning in May 2008 with the launch of the Sentinel Initiative.
94  The goal of the 
program is to create an electronic database which contains information about patient 
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response to drugs, biologics, and medical devices.
95  Janet Woodcock has been an 
outspoken supporter of electronic health record (EHR) collection in furtherance of PM.
96  
In fact, she believes that CER and PM can work together to gather information from the 
community rather than the research lab, thereby collecting greater amounts of more 
pragmatic data.
97  
Infrastructure suggested as part of CER aligns perfectly with this design. For 
instance, one of the four goals of CER as stated in the 2009 report is to develop a 
“distributed practice-based data network, longitudinal linked administrative or Electronic 
Health Record (EHR) databases, or patient registries.”
98  The FDA and the FCC have 
only presented sparse sketches describing the shape of this infrastructure, but it is hard to 




In spite of certain ideological and motivational differences in PM and CER, their 
practical implementation by the FDA has the potential to be symbiotic. The general 
consensus in the literature seems to be that the ideological gap can be bridged, but that 
careful vigilance will be necessary to ensure that CER does not lead the FDA astray from 
its stated goal of furthering PM.
99  The two main obstacles to the practical 
implementation of CER alongside PM at the FDA are scientific constraints on study 
design and coordination difficulties. The FDA has been actively working to implement 
PM since its inception; if FDA has failed to identify subgroups and assess relative 
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effectiveness, why should CER succeed?  The second major concern is that the data 
collection and information dissemination functions of the other agencies implementing 
CER will overlap with those at the FDA.  Nonetheless, given the widespread and growing 
concern for the preservation of PM, it is unlikely that the FDA will be hindered by CER 
in its quest for the furtherance of PM.  
 